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Abstract One interesting aspect of the Hwang-case 
has been the way in which this affair was assessed by 
academic journals such as Nature. Initially, Hwang’s 
success was regarded as evidence for the detrimental 
effects of research ethics, slowing down the pace of 
research in Western countries. Eventually, however, 
Hwang’s debacle was seen as evidence for the 
importance of ethics in the life sciences. Ironically, 
it was concluded that the West maintains its promi­
nence in science (as a global endeavour) precisely 
because it has its ethics in place. Bioethics was now 
seen as an indispensable part of quality control. In this 
article, I will claim that the Hwang case rather reveals 
that there is no reason for complacency and that there 
are substantial challenges awaiting us. They have to 
do with major transformations in the way knowledge 
is produced and research in the life sciences is 
conducted (such as the increase in pace and scale, 
globalisation and the growing importance of ICT and 
bioinformation). These transformations call for a
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different kind of bioethics. The focus must shift from 
duties of autonomous researchers concerning visible 
research subjects (“micro-ethics”) to responsibilities 
of institutionalised research networks in managing 
and processing large amounts of bioinformation 
(“macro-ethics”). Concepts such as transparency, 
reliability and benefit-sharing will become more 
important than concepts such as informed consent. 
Basically, it is a resurgence of the tension between the 
Kantian and the Hegelian view of ethics. The 
contours of macro-ethics will be elaborated notably 
as it is emerging in bioethical debates over biobank­
ing and genetic databanks.
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Introduction: Lessons from the Hwang Case
On 12 March 2004 the South-Korean science celeb­
rity Woo-Suk Hwang announced that his team had 
succeeded in cloning human stem cells. He pointed 
out that his research was carried out for therapeutic 
cloning only, not for reproductive cloning, and that 
the breakthrough was likely to have a major impact 
for the fight against degenerative disorders such as 
diabetes and Parkinson’s disease. Moreover, he 
assured his readers of the ethical soundness of his 
research, stressing that it was done in compliance with
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ethical rules and standards. Notably, he stated that 
“before beginning any experiments we obtained 
approval for this study from the Institutional Review 
Board on Human Subjects” (Hwang et al. 2004, 
1669). He also stressed that donors had donated 
oocytes and cumulus cells voluntarily, and that they 
had been “fully aware of the scope of our study and 
signed an informed consent form” (idem).
Soon, however, rumours began to emerge, notably 
concerning the manner in which the egg donors had 
been recruited (Nature 429, 490). It was questioned 
whether the ethical assessment by the Institutional 
Review Board had been sufficiently rigorous. In 
short, there was a growing concern over the lack of 
transparency surrounding Hwang’s research. Eventu­
ally, it turned out that the basic research material 
(human egg cells) had been obtained from team 
members, raising serious concerns regarding health 
risks, gender issues and the voluntary nature of the 
donation. Even the reliability of the data themselves 
became an issue. In the end, Hwang admitted that the 
findings had been fabricated, and his papers were 
retracted (Kennedy 2006). His name became associ­
ated, not with a major breakthrough, but with a major 
(and highly visible) case of fraud.
One interesting aspect of the Hwang-case has been 
the way in which this affair was monitored and 
assessed by the academic research community in the 
West. It actually was a tale of two (highly competi­
tive) top journals. Whereas Hwang himself published 
his original papers in Science, a train of editorials and 
comments on the Hwang case appeared in Nature. 
The latter journal obviously felt challenged by what 
was happening in South-Korea, as well as in Science. 
Initially, in the first series of comments, the Hwang 
case was seen as evidence that South-Korea had 
become a scientific “superpower”.1 Science was 
described in terms of a global competition between 
the West and the Far East. Apparently, “Asian tigers” 
were winning this science war, notably because of the 
detrimental influence of research ethics in the West. 
Western researchers were depicted as finding them­
selves in ethical trenches, as being “stranded” and tied 
up in a “stalemate” (such as the debate over
1 “Cloning success marks Asian nations as scientific tigers. The 
successful cloning of human embryos by a South Korean team 
has alerted Western researchers to the pace of scientific and 
technological progress in East Asia”. (Nature, 427, 664).
reproductive and/or therapeutic cloning, Nature 427, 
664). Science in East Asia on the other hand was 
described in terms of a Blitz war, a massive attack on 
Western positions,2 fuelled by funding on an unprec­
edented scale, allowing South-Korea and other Asian 
nations (such as China, Japan and Vietnam) to emerge 
as the new frontiers of science (Nature 435, 26, 393). 
Western visitors were taken aback by the sheer scale 
of Hwang’s research facilities (Nature 429, 13). In 
this global competition or “arms race” (Nature 438, 
135), institutionalized ethics (committees, regulations, 
procedures), in combination with a science unfriendly 
“moral climate” (i.e. widespread distrust in science 
and technophobia) was seen as delaying and frustrat­
ing scientific progress in Western countries, while in 
East Asia scientific progress was apparently “encour­
aged” by a much more science-friendly atmosphere. 
Even Hwang himself attributed his success to a 
“supportive cultural environment, well-funded labo­
ratories and legislation that permits cloning of human 
embryos for research”. Willingness to donate egg 
cells by Korean donors was explained by him in terms 
of “cultural differences”. He also praised the work 
ethic in his lab: “No Saturday, no Sunday and no 
holidays” (Nature 427, 664). Compared to the West, 
South-Korean science could profit from “national 
pride” and a great willingness to serve the common 
good (Nature 429, 14).
As the affair was heading for debacle, however, a 
dramatic reversal in the comments and editorials in 
Nature became apparent, notably with respect to the 
role and significance of research ethics. The question 
whether ethics constitutes an obstacle for research or 
rather a support, was suddenly addressed in a 
completely different manner. Life science ethics or 
bioethics now emerged as an indispensable monitor­
ing tool, an important aspect of quality control. Tight 
regulations were now seen as a strength, rather than as 
a weakness. On 17 November 2005 it was said that 
the Hwang case showed that, in order to maintain 
public support, researchers needed to follow “strict 
ethics guidelines” (Nature 438, 257). Skeptics world­
wide had to be persuaded that research in general and 
stem cell research in particular was being done
2 The rhetoric of the arms race was also noticeable when Gerard 
Schatten from Pittsburgh University announced his decision to 
end collaborations with Hwang’s team: Hwang had now lost 
one of his major “Western allies” (Nature 438, 262).
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ethically. If this failed, researchers would “find 
themselves on the defensive in proving that they are 
ready to stick to strict ethical codes” (idem). And on 
12 January 2006 it was firmly stated that “sound 
ethics and good research practice go hand in hand” 
(Nature 439, 117). The West had won its competition, 
its fight for primacy in science (for the time being at 
least), precisely because its research ethics was less 
flexible and more robust. In other words, Nature 
editorials and comments were rediscovering the 
importance of ethics, of the ethico-legal infrastructure: 
“Research ethics matters immensely to the health of 
the scientific enterprise. Anyone who thinks differ­
ently should seek employment in another sphere” 
(Nature 439, 118). In countries such as China and 
South-Korea, it was argued, “mechanisms for super­
vising ethics and investigating misconduct are at 
relatively early stages of development” (117). The 
Western system of teaching students about ethics, 
“imperfect as it may be, is still more advanced than 
that of many other nations” (idem). Finally Gottweis 
and Triendl more or less summed it all up by stating 
that “good governance is crucial for research” (2006, 
141). Although the absence of regulation might allow 
research to progress unimpeded, this is not always 
beneficial for research: regulatory oversight in the 
name of ethics adds an important layer to “the web of 
quality control in research” (143). The basic convic­
tion embedded in these Nature comments can be 
summarised as follows: Western competitiveness 
resided in its ethical, rather than in its technological 
“superiority”. The West had safeguarded its promi­
nence precisely because it had its ethics in place.
The suggestion, that “we” (in the West) have our 
ethics in place, is questionable. To begin with, the 
framing of the Hwang case as an “Asian” problem is 
highly dubious. Although Gerard Schatten withdrew 
his participation, he did so when the case was already 
heading for debacle, while a Western institutional 
review board, at the University of Pittsburgh, had 
approved his participation. Moreover, the dubious 
claim made by Hwang concerning the willingness of 
Asian women to put the greater national good ahead 
of their own welfare must be seen as part of Hwang’s 
rhetorical strategy while under siege and therefore 
viewed with skepticism.
In this article I will argue that, although ethics has 
indeed become an embedded dimension in the fabric 
of knowledge production in Western countries, there
is no reason for complacency. Rather, the Hwang case 
is an indication that bioethics worldwide (in the West 
as well as in the East) is facing tremendous 
challenges. They arise from the ways in which 
contemporary research practices are actually evolving 
in terms of pace and scale. These transformations put 
pressures on our ethical infrastructures and the 
question is whether bioethics anywhere in the world 
is really “ready” for these developments. I will argue 
that in important respects, we are behind schedule. 
Basically, mainstream Western science ethics has 
developed on the basis of the idea that research is 
done by more or less autonomous individuals, able 
and willing to take responsibility for their own 
research, making their own decisions. In contempo­
rary research practices, however, research is usually 
carried out by international and interdisciplinary 
teams, by large consortia or networks of more or less 
“anonymous” (rather than “autonomous”) researchers. 
Some of the basic constituents of traditional bioethics 
may have become outdated by the way in which 
scientific research practices are actually developing. 
Although traditional concepts such as autonomy, 
responsibility and informed consent (IC) remain 
important no doubt, we have to address a number of 
relatively new and complicated issues on the macro­
level as well. On this level, the question is not 
whether or why informed consent (for instance) is 
important. Rather, the question is how such principles 
are to be institutionalised and maintained in a global­
ising and competitive environment.
Whereas the focus of micro-ethics basically is on 
the obligations of individual researchers vis-à-vis 
individual research subjects, macro-ethics rather 
addresses the issue of how moral practices are to be 
organised. The focus now shifts from issues such as 
autonomy and human rights to issues such as 
transparency and participation. This does not mean 
that “traditional” concepts such as informed consent 
(IC) become unimportant, but we increasingly need to 
address them from a different angle. In the context of 
an interaction between an individual researcher and an 
individual research subject, facing one another, the 
issue of IC will be addressed differently than when we 
are dealing with (electronic) interactions between 
large groups of anonymous individuals, separated 
from one another in space and time, in the context of 
genetic databanking for example. In the latter case, 
the concept of IC will not become irrelevant, of
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course, but will become part of a web of often novel 
and complicated questions.
It is possible and even useful, of course, to assess 
the Hwang case from the perspective of traditional 
science ethics or micro-ethics, as I will call it. Hwang 
is then seen as an autonomous researcher who in the 
end must be held responsible for what happened in his 
lab, and this is an important dimension no doubt. 
Such a perspective will highlight aspects such as 
Hwang’s failure to treat the women who provided the 
eggs respectfully (not only by exerting implicit 
pressure on the consent of his junior research team 
members, but also by buying over half of the eggs he 
used from a Korean egg broker), as well as his 
untruthfulness concerning the numbers of eggs he 
used. Initially Hwang claimed that he had created 
eleven stem cell lines from just over two hundred 
eggs, while actually using 2,200 ova to produce 
precisely zero stem cell lines (Dickenson 2007). Yet, 
if we limit ourselves to such an approach, other 
aspects and issues are bound to become eclipsed, such 
as “science and culture” aspects (to what extent can 
we extrapolate “Western” principles to Asian con­
texts?) or “science and politics” aspects (the political 
pressures and expectations involved). South-Korea 
had invested significantly in Hwang’s lab and 
demanded something in return, products that would 
boost the nation’s international status. But this is not 
typical for East Asia. For similar reasons, President 
Clinton wanted to become associated with the costly 
and prestigious Human Genome Project by announc­
ing (on June 26, 2000) its upcoming completion. 
Moreover, Hwang’s research was really teamwork and 
one may wonder whether and to what extent Hwang 
himself (who invested significant amounts of time in 
activities such as touring and lecturing) was fully 
aware of what was actually going on in “his” 
laboratory. In order for such aspects to be addressed, 
a macro-ethical perspective is called for.
This paper consists of three parts. First of all, I will 
outline some of the changes that are taking place in 
scientific research worldwide, in terms of increase of 
scale, notably in areas such as genomics. More and 
more often, normative issues in science have to do 
with assembling and managing huge amounts of 
information. I will argue that this development calls 
for a different kind of research ethics than the 
basically “Kantian” micro-ethic that was developed 
during the second half of the Twentieth Century.
Subsequently, I will point out that the shift from a 
more or less principle-oriented approach, formulating 
obligations between individual agents (micro-ethics), 
to a more or less procedural approach, focusing on 
governance and transparency, on issues of organisa­
tion and institutionalisation (macro-ethics) is not 
without precedent. Basically, it is a “revival” (under 
modern conditions) of the tension between the ethical 
views of Kant and Hegel, between Moralität and 
Sittlichkeit. These dimensions of ethics are not in 
opposition to one another. Rather, they must be seen 
as complementary, more or less depending on each 
other. In the final sections, I will further elucidate the 
concept of macro-ethics by means of two examples, 
namely the use of animals in biomedical research and 
the ethics of databanking or biobanking. The basic 
claim of my paper will be that, although micro-ethics 
and macro-ethics are both important, we have to 
acknowledge that whereas research ethics on the 
micro-level is relatively well-advanced, macro-ethics 
still finds itself in a rather early stage of development. 
While we are relatively “fluent” when it comes to 
addressing issues such as autonomy and IC, our 
competences on the level of macro-bioethics are 
somewhat less developed. Bioethics is already mov­
ing in the direction of macro-ethics, putting more and 
more emphasis on ethics as an intrinsic part of science 
governance, and I will argue that we should encour­
age ourselves to proceed in this direction.
Do “We” Have our Ethics In Place? The Issue 
of Scale
While Gregor Mendel was an isolated researcher, 
without a formal research position or research grant 
(Orel 1996), and while the structure of DNA was 
uncovered by two scientists engrossed in an unofficial 
research quest, dropping out from their official 
research assignment more or less (Watson 1968/ 
1996), contemporary research tends to be organised 
in the form of large-scale, multi-centre research 
endeavours, often involving hundreds of researchers 
and huge amounts of funding, bringing together 
experts from various fields and backgrounds. Where­
as Mendel published a one-author article, and Watson 
and Crick’s famous two-page publication (1953) 
involved only two authors, the Nature and Science 
publications that announced the completion of the
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“working draft” version of the human genome 
(IHGSC 2001, Venter et al. 2001) listed hundreds of 
“authors”. This raises a question of a Foucauldian 
type: What does it mean to be an author in the 
genomics era? (Foucault 1994).3 Or, more generally: 
What does it mean to be a scientist, under contempo­
rary conditions of pace and scale? To what extent is it 
still possible for individual researchers to constitute 
themselves as autonomous, responsible, decision­
making agents?
An important dimension is of course the role of 
ICT. The computer has emerged as the generic 
research instrument, comparable to the book in 
Alexandrian and scholastic scholarship, quickly trans­
forming virtually all research fields, not only in terms 
of contrivances for accurate measurement, data 
analysis and visualisation, but also in terms of 
communication and globalisation. An instrument 
originally designed as a powerful calculation machine 
was successfully transformed into a communication 
device (Licklider and Taylor 1968). Virtually all 
scientific disciplines of today have dramatically 
changed—in terms of their basic methodology, their 
technology, and even their epistemology—because of 
ICT. In the computer era, the key words are 
information and exchange. From a philosophical point 
of view, information is an intriguing phenomenon 
(Gaskell and Bauer 2006, 9 ff.; Thacker 2005). 
Because it is immaterial, it can migrate quite easily 
through electronic channels of communication. It can 
be managed, analysed and manipulated in various 
ways. Information is multi-functional and can acquire 
relevance and meaning in various contexts. Biomed­
ical research has become very much an endeavour of 
producing, exchanging and interpreting information 
on an increasingly large scale. In many ways, the 
Human Genome Project (HGP) can be regarded as a 
paradigm for what is happening in the life sciences 
more broadly. It exemplifies not only the importance 
of scale, management and collaboration, but also of
3 According to Foucault, authorship has fulfilled various 
functions in the course of history. In the scholastic era, it 
functioned as a quality mark or guarantee of truth (“Aristoteles 
dixit”). In the modern period, attribution of a particular finding 
to a particular author (through a formal publication in a 
scholarly journal) helped to solve priority conflicts. Nowadays, 
authorship has acquired new functions, for example in the 
context of retrieval or assessments of the performance of 
research groups.
electronic databases. On the ethical and legal level, 
the management of biomedical information raises 
complicated issues of ownership and responsibility, 
transparency and discretion.
Yet, while research in the life sciences is evolving 
into a large-scale, global, collective enterprise of 
bioinformation production and exchange, the traditional 
focus of life science ethics still tends to be on the 
responsibilities and duties of individual researchers (as 
autonomous agents) towards individual others that are 
physically present. And indeed, Western bioethics has 
become quite competent when it comes to addressing 
ethical issues on the micro-level (N=1), where the 
focus is on respecting the autonomy of visible and 
tangible individuals (notably research subjects) in the 
context of one-to-one communications. Although this 
basic dimension of ethics will never become complete­
ly irrelevant, we cannot claim to have our ethics “in 
place” as long as we, as a complementary effort, over 
and above micro-ethical concerns, increase our com­
petence to address novel issues emerging on the 
macro-level, issues that are an inherent part of research 
as a large-scale, global and collective enterprise, where 
N=many and individuals as a rule will hardly become 
visible as individuals. Bioethics is shifting and has to 
shift its focus from the level of personal responsibilities 
in face-to-face interactions towards issues of bioinfor­
mation management, critically assessing the best 
practices evolving and the governance issues arising— 
in short, a more procedural type of ethics. Issues such 
as IC will not be regarded as unimportant on this level, 
but they will be reframed and readdressed. For instance, 
the question will not be whether or why IC is important 
per se, but rather how it can be realized and 
institutionalized, what best practices have emerged in 
various countries and contexts, and how they should be 
morally assessed? In other words, the focus shifts from 
an approach that basically addresses individual 
researchers as autonomous agents to an approach that 
looks at research communities as social networks 
embedded in political and cultural environments.
It would be a mistake to regard the increase in 
scale and pace, or more generally: the transformation 
of knowledge production that is currently evolving in 
the life sciences, a priori as a threat to ethics or even 
to humanity. Rather, the emergence of novel research 
practices, although they will challenge established 
moral frameworks no doubt, will also provide new 
opportunities for positioning and redefining ourselves
Ô  Springer
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as responsible moral subjects. Yet, increasingly, 
responsibility will become a collective effort that has 
to be consciously organised. Issues such as transpar­
ency, trust, professionalism and reliability will be key 
concepts in this domain. The same goes for issues 
involved in globalisation. Ethical quandaries will 
increasingly emerge against the backdrop of global 
collaboration and competition, and researchers will 
increasingly have to define themselves as moral 
subjects on an international scale. This also means 
that international institutions (such as UNESCO) will 
be expected to play an increasingly important role.
Moralität versus Sittlichkeit
An important point of departure for post World War II 
bioethics has been the philosophy of Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804), who formulated the principle that we 
should act in such a way that we treat humanity, both 
in our own person and in the person of others, not as a 
means only, but always as an end in itself (1785/ 
1903). The question is: how can we use someone (as 
a source of information, in the context of an 
experiment for instance) and still respect and ac­
knowledge his or her autonomy as a moral person? 
The answer is: by asking (informed) consent. This 
principle became the cornerstone of research ethics 
and was built into countless codes of conduct both 
nationally and internationally. The focus, however, 
remains on scientist as responsible, individual agents, 
on the duties of individual researchers towards 
individual research subjects in the context of face- 
to-face interactions. The core issue in such an ethic is: 
respecting the autonomy of the immediate “other” 
(the research subject). The autonomy of this other 
must not be subordinated or sacrificed to the interests 
of other “others” (notably future patients). Other 
“others” are not completely absent from a micro- 
ethical perspective, of course, and they may come into 
view through extrapolation, but the micro-situation 
remains the standard model. In a Kantian ethic, 
individuals remain abstract entities, rather than con­
crete individuals acting in concrete situations. Their 
consent as rational agents is what counts, not their 
biographies or institutional positioning. Kantian ethics 
envisions individuals in abstracto. Autonomy is an 
“assignment”, moreover, rather than a privilege. 
Finally, in a Kantian perspective, autonomy means
that we must dare to think for ourselves, to follow the 
imperatives of practical reason. It implies non­
conformity: follow your own rational rules, rather 
than conforming yourself to collective strategies of 
behaviour.
Although this approach clearly has its strengths, it 
obviously has its weaknesses as well. Notably, it fails 
to see issues such as IC in a broader context (for 
example as a contrivance that facilitates research).4 It 
sees human individuals as theoretical entities rather 
than as concrete persons working in institutionalised 
environments, and therefore, a Kantian approach may 
not be very helpful when it comes to addressing the 
actual power issues, social factors and inequalities 
involved in research settings. Many debates over 
informed consent have to do with the “empirical” 
question, to what extent the consent given can really 
be regarded as voluntary (for example in the case of 
research with children, mentally retarded subjects, 
students or terminally ill patients)? For this, the social 
context, the broader working conditions have to be 
taken into account. Contemporary science is now 
adding some new concerns to these more “familiar” 
issues regarding individuals who may not be as 
autonomous as a Kantian ethics presupposes, such 
as: what should autonomy and IC amount to in 
research practices that take the form of global 
exchange of bioinformation and data-driven (rather 
than hypothesis-driven) research? How to address 
individual rights in the context of data-mining?
The awareness that autonomy, although important, 
does not in and of itself allow us to address concrete 
issues and actual problems emerging in real-life 
contexts is not new. On the contrary, one could say 
that this type of criticism was already formulated by 
Hegel (1770-1831) in the first decades of the 
nineteenth century (1821/1970). He argued that, 
although abstract normative principles directed to­
wards guiding behaviour on the micro-level are 
important, we have to take the societal environment 
into account as well. Hegel referred to this as 
Sittlichkeit or “ethical life”. On this level, the focus 
shifts from abstract principles (addressing individual 
subjects) to the ways in which these principles are 
realized or institutionalized. To frame it in contempo­
rary terms: attention is now given to practices of
4 Cf. the Hwang case: building an IC procedure into the trial 
becomes a technical ingredient in setting up a research design.
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application and implementation that are actually 
developing. In order for IC (for example) to work, 
we need a supportive ethical environment, a societal 
atmosphere in which such principles are regarded as 
important, not only by individual actors, but by large 
numbers of people. Society is then seen as a collective 
enterprise, where N=many. Individual actors emerge 
as participants in complex networks that guide and 
facilitate (or discourage) certain types of behaviour. 
Conformity with existing practices and established 
lines of behaviour now becomes a positive feature. 
Ethics must focus its attention on these practices, the 
routines and guidelines they involve, by asking 
questions such as: how to implement normative 
principles and keep them up-to-date? This type of 
ethics will assess the functioning of ethical commit­
tees and of ethical expertise rather than analyzing the 
precise meaning of the word “autonomy”. On the 
level of Sittlichkeit, ethics is not about face-to-face 
interactions, but rather about responsibilities of 
researchers in general towards large numbers of 
anonymous, invisible others. Hegel’s view is not that 
Moralität is unimportant. Rather he insists that 
autonomy remains an abstract idea that somehow 
has to come to life, has to function in concrete 
settings on the macro-level, in the form of institutions 
and policies.5
Finally, macro-ethics allows us to loosen the 
association of ethics with anthropocentrism. Kantian 
ethics is basically about the duties of one particular 
moral subject towards another, where “moral subject” 
is identical to “human being”, since (according to 
Kant and his followers) only humans are open to 
moral reasoning and susceptible to the voice of 
conscience. Macro-ethics, however, addresses the 
moral qualities of institutions, organizations and 
regulations, of research practices as such. Sustainabil­
ity, for example, is a concept that is difficult to 
acknowledge within a Kantian framework, but from a 
macro-ethical perspective a normative assessment of 
research practices from the point of view of sustain­
ability obviously makes sense.
5 The book The imperative o f  responsibility by Hans Jonas 
(1979/1984) may also be mentioned in this respect. Jonas 
argues that, whereas traditional ethics basically concerns itself 
with immediate and small-scale duties involved in interactions 
between individuals here and now, the new powers of science 
and technology force us to broaden the scale of our normative 
thinking in terms of time and space.
I am not claiming that macro-ethics is more 
important than micro-ethics. Rather, they must be 
seen as complementary dimensions. Sooner or later, 
issues such as IC, initially emerging in a micro­
setting, will have to be addressed on a macro-level as 
well. I am not suggesting that macro-ethics is 
inexistent. On the contrary, macro-ethical issues have 
received due attention in various contexts, but it is my 
conviction that the life science as they are evolving 
today entail new challenges that will predominantly 
have to be addressed in macro-terms. Historically 
speaking, research ethics (notably the ethics of 
biomedical research) originated in the context of 
experimentation with human subjects. Worldwide 
rejection of the use of prisoners during World War II 
greatly reinforced general awareness of the pivotal 
importance of IC. The (macro-ethical) question how 
to institutionalise biomedical research ethics has 
always been on the agenda as well. The post-war 
resurgence of ethics resulted in the establishment of 
bioethics committees as a basic tool for safeguarding 
autonomy. Issues such as the meaning and status of 
ethical expertise or questions concerning the role of 
ethics committees—for instance, should consensus 
formation be regarded a viable objective? (Ten Have 
and Sass 1998)—have been thoroughly debated. 
Procedures for ethical assessment became an inherent 
part of research activities. Still, the starting point 
remained the Kantian question “What ought I to do?” 
and the emphasis was on the autonomy of individuals 
who participated in research trials. The way biomed­
ical and biological research is now evolving, however, 
forces us to broaden our perspective. I will elucidate 
this by means of two examples.
A First Exemplification: Animals in Biomedical 
Research
The discussion over the use of (vertebrate) animals in 
biomedical research may stand as a first “problem 
file” to exemplify the shift indicated above. Until 
recently, the focus in this debate was on basic ethical 
concerns, such as animal suffering, animal rights, the 
integrity of animals and intrinsic value. Participants in 
ethical debate tried to convince one another that 
animals have (or do not have) basic rights, that they 
have (or do not have) intrinsic value, that they should 
(or should not) be regarded as subjects of experience,
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etcetera. On a theoretical level, advocates of utilitar­
ianism for example would argue that the amount of 
suffering is all-important while Kantians would argue 
that only those entities can have rights that may 
acknowledge the rights of others (and this apparently 
only applies to humans). On a more practical level, 
the issue of how to balance animal suffering against 
the interests of future patients was addressed on the 
level of basic considerations that somehow had to be 
traded-off against one another.
In recent years, however, the emphasis has shifted 
quite unequivocally to a different set of issues, a 
different type o f questions, of a much more procedural 
nature. Moral deliberations and concerns nowadays 
tend to focus on the adequacy, efficiency and 
transparency of the assessment process of animal 
research as it is carried out by animal ethics 
committees and other institutionalised bodies. What 
kinds of expertise should be represented in such 
committees? What should be their role and, above all, 
how transparent should the process be? To what 
extent should commissions share their input, their 
considerations and their output with the outside 
world? How confidential is the information handled 
by those involved? In other words, the focus has 
moved from basic principles and concepts to proce­
dural issues and to the moral quandaries involved in 
the management of “sensitive” bioinformation.
One important procedural issue is representation. 
Can we leave the decision making to the expert 
committees, or should the public be involved, or at 
least informed, and how should this be organised? 
Should it be made public for instance how many 
animals are used and for what purposes? Or would 
such a policy conflict with concerns of confidentiality 
when dealing with vulnerable intellectual property 
such as research proposals? Who exactly is responsi­
ble for making decisions in this domain (researchers, 
committees, institutes?) and how are these decisions 
made? In other words, how is the process of moral 
deliberation institutionalised and organised? What 
best practices have evolved in various countries? Is 
global harmonisation or research regulation possible? 
To what extent can experts involved in this process be 
trusted by the public? Who are they representing?
These are normative issues, no doubt, but they 
approach the issues at hand from a different angle. 
Moreover, animal research has become an international 
and even global endeavour. Strict regulations on the
national level may not reduce the amount of animals 
used for research, nor the suffering to which they are 
exposed, but may rather stimulate the migration of 
research activities to other geographical areas where 
regulations are less severe, or to competing research 
networks (unless harmonisation can be established, for 
example on the European level). Research with 
animals basically produces information, and this 
implies that the actual site where the research is 
conducted is of relative importance. Information can 
be exchanged, in the context of global networks, and 
the actual work with animals may migrate to 
countries where legal constraints are relatively mild. 
One could say that, to the extent that research has 
become a global affair, research ethics has to become 
a global affair as well, in order to remain effective. 
Thus, the focus of concern has shifted from debates 
over the value and status of living entities to debates 
over the management o f  information. The latter 
includes issues such as transparency, accessibility, 
reliability and confidentiality.
Biomedical Research in the Bioinformation Era
My second example concerns the use of bioinforma­
tion (notably genetic information) in research. As was 
indicated above, the focus of biomedical research 
practices is changing. Globalisation, “informatisation” 
and the increase of scale are omnipresent features of 
contemporary bioscience. Besides trials involving 
visible and tangible research subjects (patients, 
students or others), another source of information is 
becoming increasingly important, namely databases 
containing bioinformation provided by anonymous 
(and often healthy) individuals. A biobank is a source 
of data for researchers, physicians, patients and others 
and exemplifies the growing importance of bioinfor­
mation in research and health care. It can be defined 
as an interface between individuals (patients or 
healthy individuals) providing data or bodily materi­
als on the one hand, and biomedical researchers using 
these data and materials on the other. Professionals 
involved in biobanking have the obligation to provide 
high quality, accurate data, while at the same time 
respecting the rights of privacy and confidentiality of 
the providers. The growing importance of biobanking 
implies a dramatic change for research ethics, a shift 
of focus from practices involving interactions be­
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tween visible individuals to novel practices consisting 
in the management and interpretation of information, 
notably genetic information, where individuals usual­
ly remain invisible.
This change has been clearly outlined by Collins 
(1999) in a famous article in which he presents the 
HGP as exemplifying an ongoing paradigm shift in 
medicine and biology: the dawning of the information 
era. According to Collins, the HGP is basically an 
effort to sequence our genetic code, making the 
information available to research communities world­
wide through a public repository (GenBank, www. 
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov). According to Collins, genomics 
changes the way in which biomedical and biological 
research is done. Research subjects or patients as 
embodied individuals are no longer the main target of 
this type of research. Rather, genomics is directed 
towards producing, using and interpreting (genetic 
and other forms of) bioinformation. This has con­
sequences for ethical or societal research as well. In 
the context of the HGP, the use and interpretation of 
information was identified as the first high priority 
area for ELSI (ethical, legal, social issues) research 
(Collins 1999, 34). In Collins’ vision, future individ­
uals will (on the basis of interactive electronic IC 
procedures) increasingly use genetic tests based on 
knowledge retrieved from large-size databases before 
making important decisions (such as career choice). 
Thus, in the “genomics” or “bioinformation” era, the 
focus of biomedical research will shift towards novel 
practices based on using and interpreting information 
provided by large populations.
It is no coincidence, therefore, that a growing part 
of the bioethical literature is devoted to issues 
involved in genetic databases and biobanking. The 
traditional biomedical and bioethical situation (the 
encounter between researcher and research subject) is 
complemented (and to a certain extent eclipsed) by a 
novel situation in which large numbers of (often 
healthy) individuals provide information to databases.
6 A similar position was taken by Collins’ competitor Craig 
Venter, who characterized the research facility Celera he set up 
as “an information company” (Shreeve, 120), a source of 
genomic information on a global scale, a massive database that 
could be consulted by researchers, but also by individuals who 
wanted to govern their own health condition on the basis of 
genomic information. Indeed, Celera’s formal mission state­
ment was to become the “definitive source of genomic 
information” worldwide.
In the traditional encounter, the Kantian “What ought 
I to do?” was answered in terms of the categorical 
imperative demanding professionals to treat humanity, 
represented by this one tangible, visible individual, as 
an end in itself. Biobanking, however, exemplifies 
research under different conditions, on a much larger 
scale, involving completely different kinds of inter­
action between researchers and research subjects, 
mediated by electronic devices. Individuals are 
basically providers of data. In principle, they remain 
anonymous and invisible. Indeed, while their infor­
mation continues to be stored, managed and pro­
cessed in electronic libraries, they themselves may no 
longer be alive. Communication is virtual and digital. 
Discrete human beings are replaced by stored infor­
mation as the object of data-driven research. In order 
to adequately address the ethical issues involved in 
such practices, we need a biomedical research ethics 
for collective enterprises devoted to management of 
sensitive bioinformation on a large scale. The fact that 
scientific research has become a complex, technolo­
gy-dependent enterprise may increasingly outdate the 
focus of traditional bioethics on individual duties 
towards the discrete moral subjects we are facing. The 
shift in focus from individuals (N=1) to populations 
(N=many) and from encounters with individuals who 
are physically present to exchange of bioinformation 
calls for a different approach.
The conviction that the emergence of biobanking 
implies new challenges for bioethics is clearly 
addressed by Knoppers and Chadwick (2005). Popu­
lation-based genetic research, they claim, has led to 
calls for rethinking the paramount position of the 
individual in ethics. Whereas individual-oriented 
ethics will place much emphasis on principles such 
as IC, in the new situation other issues become 
important, such as solidarity and trust.
This explains why notably in ethical debates over 
biobanking and genetic databanking authors are 
moving beyond the more or less traditional agenda 
of bioethics. According to Williams (2005), our 
“dominant focus on individual rights [is] ill-suited” 
when it comes to reflecting on issues involved in 
large scale collaborative research (51). The most 
important dimension that the IC language fails to 
address, he claims, is that of power. Individuals are 
confronted with large-scale, highly professional 
organizations functioning in electronic environments. 
An IC procedure will not allow us to address the
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moral quandaries emerging in such a situation: 
“requiring consent will not, by itself, alter the fact 
that uncoordinated individuals are always subject to 
the power of organised groups or institutions” (53). 
Indeed, a focus on individual rights may even “hinder 
us in appreciating the ethical issues that large-scale 
biobanks raise” (51). Important social, political and 
scientific questions are left out of consideration.
Apparently, there is a growing conviction that 
biobanks and bioinformatics databases introduce new 
types of conflict and tension that cannot be addressed in 
terms of the traditional bioethical toolbox. One of these 
conflicts is that between the scientific ideal of free 
access to detailed, up-to-date bioinformatics databases 
(an important methodological condition, but an ethical 
ideal as well) and the traditional ideal of informed 
individual autonomy (Bovenberg 2005). In order to 
“harvest” the new potentials for life-sciences, research­
ers will often want to make use of databases in a much 
more flexible manner, in various contexts and for 
various purposes. Yet IC procedures set limits to the 
use of biobank information (Bovenberg 2005). In order 
to articulate the interests of individuals who act as 
sources of information, other ethical tools and con­
cepts, such as benefit sharing or engagement in 
agenda-setting for research, may become much more 
important than IC. In other words, the management of 
biomedical information generates new questions 
concerning accessibility of information, priority setting 
and fairness. Individuals, patient organizations, even 
the public at large may well become more interested in 
co-developing the agenda for research than in the legal 
intricacies of IC. Similar to the shift towards proce­
dural issues in animal ethics such as transparency, there 
is a growing interest in the biomedical field in moving 
away from the traditional ethics expert committee 
model (applying micro-level principles to cases and 
research applications) towards developing methods to 
involve much broader audiences in moral deliberations, 
through panels, surveys, discussion forums and other 
ways of consulting and involving “publics”. This 
again reflects the desire to move away from the 
traditional IC issues towards broader ones such as: for 
what purposes (or even: for which research programs) 
do we as a society find the use of animals in research 
legitimate?
All this implies that bioethicists should be more 
interested in the collective responsibilities of research 
communities engaged in exchanging and interpreting
bioinformation than in the personal (immediate) 
duties of researchers on the micro-level. Research 
ethics has become part of science governance as a 
comprehensive approach in which privacy regulations 
constitute only one element among various other 
considerations. Issues involved in institutionalisation 
at various levels (the role of ethics committees and of 
various forms of expertise, the process of quality 
control, priority setting and funding policies, regu­
lations for managing electronic databases) will in­
creasingly determine the bioethical agenda. Besides 
IC, other normative concepts (free access, transpar­
ency, benefit sharing, open source IP policies, public 
engagement) will gain importance. And as far as IC is 
concerned, the focus will be on how it is to be 
organized, maintained and balanced against other 
important normative issues.
Moreover, IC procedures must not be seen as 
evolving in a moral vacuum. Rather, they presuppose 
a supportive moral culture or climate—a “moral life” 
as Hegel phrased it. IC remains an abstract issue as 
long as the legitimacy and trustworthiness of institu­
tions involved in research practices (locally as well as 
globally) are left out of consideration. This is also a 
basic lesson from the Hwang case. In a world of 
global competition and collaboration it becomes 
increasingly important to ensure that standards of 
oversight in laboratories worldwide are sufficiently 
adequate for making the Hwang scenario increasingly 
“improbable” (Nature 439, 117). This calls for trans­
national institutions, moral “players” in the global 
field of science ethics.
One of the candidate institutions for playing such a 
role is UNESCO, author of documents like The 
Human Genome and Human Rights and Declaration 
o f  human norms in bioethics and Code o f Conducts 
for Scientists, but this is a contentious issue. First of 
all, in many respects these UNESCO documents are 
still addressing researchers from a classical (micro- 
ethical) perspective, as autonomous individual agents. 
They do not really enable research communities to 
manage the moral quandaries that are emerging in 
contemporary science as a large-scale, global enter­
prise. They build on established ethical principles, 
rather than on a solid analysis of how life science 
research is actually evolving within society. More­
over, in the editorial to a special issue of Developing 
World Bioethics, the latter UNESCO declaration has 
been fiercely criticized (Landman and Schüklenk
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2007). It was argued that the concepts used in this 
document were too general and vague to generate 
real commitment and, moreover, that UNESCO was 
not supposed to issue such declarations at all. 
According to the authors, bioethics should be left 
to the bioethicists. Although I do not find the argu­
ments used for criticising this document very 
convincing (Zwart 2007), the debate as such indi­
cates that the development of a global macro-ethics 
still finds itself in an early, “prenormal” stage. 
Moreover, organisations such as UNESCO are just 
as much a product of global forces as are researchers 
and their organisations. So far, national institutions 
play a much more prominent role in safeguarding the 
ethical standards for research than international 
bodies.
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